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The role of law in global value chains: a
research manifesto
The IGLP Law and Global Production Working Group*

Across a growing number of sectors and industries, value production is not just
transnational in scope; it is organised and coordinated via global networks that link
activities across as well as within firms and nations. These networks are increasingly
referred to as ‘Global Value Chains’, or GVCs. The asserted causes of this phenomenon are multiple, and scholars debate which deserves designation as primary.1 We
*

In alphabetical order: Grietje Baars, The City Law School, City University London. Email: grietje
.baars.1@city.ac.uk; Jennifer Bair, Department of Sociology, University of Colorado at Boulder; Liam
Campling, School of Business and Management, Queen Mary University of London; Dan Danielsen,
Northeastern University School of Law; Dennis Davis, Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town; Klaas
Hendrik Eller, Faculty of Law, University of Cologne; Dez Farkas, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University; Tomaso Ferrando, Warwick Law School; Jason Jackson, The Wharton School, University
of Pennsylvania; David Hansen-Miller, Independent Scholar; Elizabeth Havice, Department of
Geography, University of North Carolina; Claire Mummé, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor;
Jesse Salah Ovadia, School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University; David Quentin,
City Political Economy Research Centre, City University London; Brishen Rogers, Temple University
Beasley School of Law; Jaakko Salminen, Faculty of Law, University of Turku; Alvaro Santos, Georgetown
University Law Center; Benjamin Selwyn, Department of International Relations, University of Sussex;
Marlese von Broembsen, Institute of Development and Labour Law, University of Cape Town; and Lucie
E. White, Harvard Law School. The ideas presented in this paper were developed via conversations among
members of this group during a series of workshops at Harvard University, Northeastern University
School of Law and City University London organised under the auspices of the Institute for Global Law
and Policy (IGLP) at Harvard University School of Law.

1

Among the most frequent causes cited are the dominance of shareholder value theory—W Milberg
& D Winkler, Outsourcing Economics: Global Value Chains in Capitalist Development (Cambridge
UP, 2013)—trade liberalization and new regional and bilateral trade and investment
agreements—UNCTAD, Global Value Chains and Development: Investment and Value Added
Trade in the Global Economy, UN Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/2013/1 (2013)—and technologies enabling
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Most scholars attribute the development and ubiquity of global value chains to
economic forces, treating law as an exogenous factor, if at all. By contrast, we
assert the centrality of legal regimes and private ordering mechanisms to the
creation, structure, geography, distributive effects and governance of Global
Value Chains (GVCs), and thereby seek to establish the study of law and GVCs as
rich and important terrain for research in its own right.
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cheaper and faster transportation and logistics—D Cowen, The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping
Violence in Global Trade (University of Minnesota Press, 2014).
2

At first blush, the areas of law most implicated in GVCs could include company, contract, employment and tax law, as well as international trade law, commercial and investment law. Yet, when one
begins to consider the diverse impacts of GVCs economically, socially, politically, environmentally
and so forth, it is hard to think of a field of law that might not be relevant to them, from human
rights law to environmental law to laws governing the behaviour of firms in elections or upon the
legislative process. In addition, soft law regimes, including guidelines on corporate social responsibility, technical standards, fair trade and other ethical certification standards, and customary rules
of business practice will also likely be significant to the extent that they shape the behaviour of firms
individually or collectively in GVCs. Moreover, the practices of firms as they deal with each other
commercially, through trade or industry associations or in influencing behaviour of other firms in
the chain—what might be loosely termed ‘private ordering mechanisms’, will also be important if we
are trying to understand how GVCs are coordinated or how risk and reward are distributed through
chain structures. We recognise that the boundaries between these diverse normative orders, at least
in terms of their effects, is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain, and observation of business
practices quickly reveals that a contractual term might be as significant as a public law regulation in
shaping the behaviour of actors in global commerce. For these reasons, we use ‘law’ as a shorthand
for hard and soft law regimes and private ordering mechanisms.

Downloaded from http://lril.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on April 4, 2016

begin from the premise that GVCs are not only the product of shifting economic
conditions. They also arise as firms engage dynamically with multiple, overlapping
and often conflicting local, national, regional and transnational legal regimes, softlaw normative orders and private ordering mechanisms (hereinafter collectively
described as ‘law’).2
This article seeks to establish the importance for both scholars and policymakers of investigating some of the complex ways in which the law shapes and
is shaped by GVCs. The research agenda articulated here emerged from a series of
ongoing conversations among a group of legal scholars, sociologists and political
economists that first met in June 2014 under the auspices of the IGLP at Harvard
University. For the most part, legal scholarship has only summarily or incidentally analysed GVCs, and similarly, GVCs scholars outside law have not made law
a focal point of their theoretical or empirical analyses. We believe that placing law
at the centre of the analysis of what have historically been treated as primarily
‘economic structures’ will not only enrich our understanding of the shape, nature
and dynamic character of GVCs, but will also help to illuminate the complex
inter-relationship between law and global political economy more broadly.
We begin with a broad description of the question at the heart of our
collective inquiry: how does law shape the structure and organisation of production globally and how is law impacted through this process? To make this
meta-question more concrete, we articulate three thematic starting points for
exploration of the relationship between law and GVCs: law and the geography
of GVCs; law and the production and distribution of value and power in GVCs;
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THE CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION

We are hardly the first to acknowledge the significance of GVCs as a feature of
modern capitalism. Former Director-General of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Pascal Lamy recently observed that GVCs, as the ‘face of the modern global
economy’, are creating a ‘new world of trade’.3 The United Nations Conference on
Trade Development (UNCTAD) recently dedicated its annual flagship publication,
the World Investment Report, to the topic of GVCs. It includes a definition of GVCs
and a quantitative estimate of their importance in the world economy:
Global investment and trade are inextricably intertwined through the
international production networks of firms investing in productive
assets worldwide and trading inputs and outputs in cross-border value
chains of various degrees of complexity. Such value chains (intra-firm
or inter-firm, regional or global in nature, and commonly referred to
as Global Value Chains or GVCs) shaped by TNCs [transnational
corporations] account for some 80% of global trade.4

While references to GVCs have proliferated rapidly in recent years, in both
academic and policy circles, our intervention is motivated by the puzzling fact
that there is as yet no well-developed account of the role of law in the structure,
operation or governance of GVCs.5 In fact, we observe that law has, for the most
3

P Lamy, ‘Global Value Chains and the New World of Trade’, Keynote address, Duke GVC Global
Summit, 20 October 2014, available at https://globalvaluechains.org/video/duke-global-summitkeynote-address (last visited 7 January 2016).

4

UNCTAD (2013) iii.

5

One notable exception is Kevin Sobel-Read’s recent article ‘Global Value Chains: A Framework for
Analysis’ 5 Transnational Legal Theory (2014) 364, which seeks to bring the insights of GVC
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and law and the coordination of GVCs (the latter being a process referred to in
the GVC literature as ‘governance’). We focus our research inquiry into the role
of law in global structures of production on GVCs both because of their ubiquity in modern capitalism and the rich variety of extant scholarship (largely
outside the field of law) exploring GVCs in a variety of industries and contexts.
This combination of factors makes GVCs a rich source for research both empirically and theoretically. In an effort to suggest, albeit in a highly preliminary
way, what a legal analysis of GVCs might entail, and what insights this line of
inquiry might yield, we include brief descriptions of several ongoing research
projects initiated by group members. Our goal is to invite scholars in law and
related disciplines to begin to view the study of law and global production as an
important and worthy field of research in its own right.
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scholarship to the attention of legal scholars, and perhaps more ambitiously, to consider the scholarly value and potential of exploring law and GVCs in relation to one another.
6

For a summary of the various contexts, groups and institutions that make use of the GVC framework, see Global Value Chains Initiative, ‘Institutions’, available at https://globalvaluechains.org/
institutions (last visited 7 January 2016) and, recently, OECD & World Bank Group, ‘Inclusive
Global Value Chains’, Report prepared for submission to G20 Trade Ministers Meeting Istanbul
(2015), available at http://www.oecd.org/trade/OECD-WBG-g20-gvc-report-2015.pdf (last visited 7
January 2016).

7

For an overview cf. M Hoehn, Relational Supply Contracts (Springer 2009) 19-34.

8

Cf. G Gereffi, ‘Global Production Systems and Third World development’, in B Stallings (ed.),
Global Change, Regional Response: The New International Context of Development (Cambridge UP,
1995) 100 and A Stewart, Gender, Law and Justice in a Global Market (Cambridge UP, 2011).
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part, been neglected by the political economists, sociologists, economic geographers and other social scientists that have pioneered GVCs as a field of study.
To the extent that law is recognised in the GVC literature, it is generally treated
as exogenous rather than an endogenous factor—an institutional backdrop
against which the economic and inter-organisational dynamics driving the globalisation of production play out. This lacuna is all the more striking because in
recent years the GVC framework has gained considerable reach beyond academic circles to business consultancies, legislators, international organisations,
unions and activists.6
It seems possible that this externalisation of law and the ‘legal’ from GVC
analysis to date may derive from an understanding of capitalism as a process of
profit-oriented, mutually beneficial exchange undertaken in (relatively) free markets. In such a vision, the function of law is primarily to provide market-facilitating institutions (such as property, contract and the corporation) and rules to
correct informational and other asymmetries in the market rather than as a tool
and terrain for struggle over the terms through which value will be generated and
distributed or power exercised in global production systems. Most considerations
of law in GVCs take the former more minimal conceptualisation of law’s role in
capitalism as a given, without interrogating what role law might play in bringing
this particular form of GVC capitalism into being. For instance, spurred on by
management studies, early business law scholarship addressing GVCs was concerned with the design of supply contracts in order to enhance efficiency and
surmount informational asymmetries.7 In general, the GVC literature continues
to treat economic units (or firms) with different national origins and varied sizes,
productive capacities and bargaining power as an analytical given, rather than as
a product of legal arrangements that could be organised differently.
In our view, law is more than an ‘external’ or contextual factor shaping
the strategic decision-making of firms ‘inside’ GVCs.8 Rather, we argue that
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9

‘Governance’ is a genuinely interdisciplinary concept. In the legal literature, it is generally used as a
shorthand for the public (municipal, state, supranational) and private (e.g., through private standard-setting and certification) regulation of, in this case, the GVC. Here, ‘governance’ is used to refer
to the shift from traditional towards more sophisticated regulatory techniques which gain traction
through knowledge and markets rather than legal sanctions. Cf. for a comparative view P
Zumbansen, ‘Governance from an Interdisciplinary Perspective’, in D Levi-Faur (ed.), Oxford
Handbook on Governance (Oxford UP, 2012). The GVC literature speaks of the ‘governance’ or
management/coordination by the lead firm of the chain. Unless reference is made to the multiple
normative layers shaping GVCs, this article will use the term in the latter meaning.

10 Cf. Sobel-Read (2014) 404.
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law resides at the heart of the GVC phenomenon—it is the vehicle through which
value is generated, captured and distributed within and between organisational
and jurisdictional domains, and diverse and geographically disparate business
operations are coordinated and governed.9 This recognition of the significance
of law is important for a richer understanding of modern capitalism as well as
the formulation and critique of policy programmes and interventions. For
example, rather than asking how firms can use law to upgrade a particular
chain configuration, we aim instead to understand how the possibilities
for upgrading are already structured in and through law—that is, how law
constitutes the power relations between actors that give rise to particular forms of governance and engender particular distributive effects. This
focus on the role that legal frameworks play at different levels of a particular
chain, and on the politico-economic power dynamics that operate behind
competing legal norms, can help facilitate a critical assessment of the structural and distributional dimensions of GVCs—and the global economy more
broadly—that are often taken for granted or normalised. Such an imaginative
legal exercise can then help to elucidate alternative and potentially more
progressive sites of intervention by scholars, policymakers and civil society
groups.
Research on law and GVCs undertaken in this spirit also suggests that the
proliferation of GVCs has implications for law and legal scholarship more
broadly. Many fields of legal inquiry are organised around distinctions that
are blurred or confounded by the global organisation of GVCs. The study of
GVCs may aid legal scholars in formulating alternatives to traditionally recognised disciplinary boundaries between local and global, law and non-law, public
regulation and private ordering, form and substance, rules and norms, firm and
contract and firm and state.10 In addition, because GVCs frequently traverse
legal forms, geographic and jurisdictional boundaries and multiple layers of
potentially applicable law, mapping GVCs from a legal perspective also poses
complex challenges for basic questions of positive legal analysis, including
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11 Cf. David Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ 34 Ohio Northern University Law Review
(2008) 827, 832: ‘[A]s the world is re-ordered, law will be there, imagining it, making it, writing it
down, consolidating and contesting the new arrangements.’
12 Cf. D Schneiderman, ‘Power and Production in Global Legal Pluralism: An International Political
Economy Approach’, in A Perry-Kessaris (ed.), Socio-Legal Approaches to International Economic
Law (Routledge, 2013) 98.
13 Cf. L Catá Backer, ‘Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Global Private
Lawmaking: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator’ 37 University of Connecticut Law Review (2007) 1739
and A Beckers, Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility Codes (Hart, 2015).
14 For the text, see Bangladesh Accord on Building and Fire Safety, available at http://bangladeshac
cord.org (last visited 7 January 2016). For an analysis, cf. M Anner, J Bair & J Blasi, ‘Toward Joint
Liability in Global Supply Chains: Addressing the Root Causes of Labor Violations in International
Subcontracting Networks’ 35 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal (2013) 1 and B ter Haar &
M Keune, ‘One Step Forward or More Window-Dressing? A Legal Analysis of Recent CSR Initiatives
in the Garment Industry in Bangladesh’ 30 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and
Industrial Relations (2014) 5.
15 Cf. G Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’, in G Teubner (ed.), Global
Law Without a State (Dartmouth, 1997), 3 and PS Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of
Law Beyond Borders (Cambridge UP, 2012). For an illustration from the global toy industry, cf. F
Snyder, The EU, the WTO and China: Legal Pluralism and International Trade Regulation (Hart,
2010) 44-88.
16 See, e.g., E Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory (Inklinks, 1978) [1924] 37-45 (arguing
that the very form of law follows the commodity form); P Ireland, ‘History, Critical Legal Studies
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matters of territorial jurisdiction, governing law, private regulation through
contract and sovereign authority.11
Moreover, just as the boundaries between legal subfields are increasingly
hard to draw, so too are the boundaries between what is hard law and what is soft
law, or what legal significance is to be given to private ordering mechanisms. We
find the study of GVCs is particularly fruitful for forcing a re-examination of
these complex questions regarding the boundaries of law itself.12 For example,
GVCs often generate unique inter-firm and cross-border norms of business
practice such as chain-wide corporate codes that, albeit of private origin, shape
parties’ behaviour as powerfully as legal commands emanating from legislation.13
Also, both public and private norms surrounding GVCs are entangled with
rapidly changing business practice and policies giving rise to novel public/private
regulatory arrangements such as the Bangladesh Accord on Building and Fire
Safety.14 As such, GVCs are an important source of norm-creation contributing
to global legal pluralism, and this scholarship’s inquiry into the co-existence and
collision of different normative orders provides a helpful tool to analyse the
complexity of normative assemblages at play.15
Our analysis of law and GVCs draws on and aims to contribute to several
strands of contemporary legal thought. For instance, Marxist legal scholars have
theorised the relationship between capital and law as symbiotic,16 and the
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DEVELOPING A CRITICAL LEGAL APPROACH TO GLOBAL
VALUE CHAINS: INITIAL RESEARCH PROJECTS

The research agenda developed by the IGLP Law and Global Production
Working Group proceeds from our collective sense that GVCs take a peculiar
shape provoked by the incongruity between the apparent territoriality of the law

and the Mysterious Disappearance of Capitalism’ 65 The Modern Law Review (2002) 120; C Miéville,
Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (Pluto, 2005); G Baars, ‘Reform or
Revolution: Marxian vs Polanyian Approaches to the Regulation of “the Economic”’ 17 Northern
Ireland Legal Quarterly (2011) 415.
17 Cf. G Teubner, ‘Idiosyncratic Production Regimes’, in J Ziman (ed.), The Evolution of Cultural
Entities (Oxford UP, 2002) 161 (using evolutionary theory to explain institutional divergence in
the law of just-in-time manufacturing and leasing).
18 Cf., e.g., F Cafaggi & P Iamiceli, ‘Private Regulation and Industrial Organization: Contractual
Governance and the Network Approach’, in S Grundmann, F Möslein & K Riesenhuber (eds),
Contract Governance (Oxford UP 2015) 343.
19 See, e.g., C Tan, ‘Navigating New Landscapes: Socio-legal Mapping of Plurality and Power in
International Economic Law’, in Perry-Kessaris (ed.) (2013) 19.
20 Cf. Teubner (1997); Berman (2012); B de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law,
Globalization and Emancipation, 2nd ed. (Cambridge UP, 2004); and, recently, H Dedek & S van
Praagh (eds), Stateless Law. Evolving Boundaries of a Discipline (Ashgate, 2015).
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analysis of the constitutive role of law in GVCs provides the opportunity to
deepen our understanding of the complex dynamics of this relationship. While
systems theory has been used to describe co-evolutionary processes of law and
production regimes,17 and institutional views explore the reciprocal relation
between chain structures and regulatory strategies essentially as a matter of
choice,18 the role of law in GVCs foregrounds questions of power and distribution. At the same time, a comprehensive analysis of law in GVCs would
harness tools developed by contemporary socio-legal19 and pluralist20 inquiries
into law. Our investigation of law and global production shares much with legal
work that questions the territorial and statist preoccupations of legal regimes,
and the separation of economic activity from political contestation. Hence, the
tension between a territorial logic of law and the transnational logic of capital as
it is expressed in GVCs becomes productive in nature. Theorising the constitutive role of the present legal landscape in the proliferation of GVCs thus
immediately invites reflections on the adequacy of this legal paradigm, both
at the conceptual level and at the level of legal reform. It is in this sense that
GVCs appear as a salient and highly topical field of research for contemporary
critical legal scholarship.
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Legal geography of GVCs

The creation and operation of GVCs involve immense complexity in terms of
the legal norms, tools and institutions involved. This complexity is multilayered, and has both organisational and geographic dimensions.
Accordingly, it will be crucial to develop techniques to study these phenomena
in ways that illustrate the particularity of diverse legal and GVC structures,
while remaining cognisant of the broader complexity of the contexts in
which these structures operate. For this reason, we focus here on mapping
the legal geography of GVCs as a vital subfield in our broader research field
of law and global structures of production.
It is by mapping the legal geography of GVCs that we can show what the
traditional division of law into discrete subfields misses or conceals, and how
domestic and international hard and soft law and private ordering mechanisms
intermingle in ways that challenge efforts to maintain clear distinctions between
them. At the same time, mapping can help to make visible the constitutive role
of law to non-legal scholars.

21 D Danielsen, ‘Beyond Corporate Governance: Why a New Approach to the Study of Corporate Law
is Needed to Address Global Inequality and Economic Development’, in U Mattei & JD Haskell
(eds), Research Handbook on Political Economy and Law (Edward Elgar, 2015) 195.
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and the transnational logic of capital. Through this collective research effort, we
hope to better understand how the legal landscape is negotiated and exploited
by firms, both in their relationships with the state and with other firms. In short,
we aim to heed Dan Danielsen’s call to ‘study the ways in which this form of
[GVC] capitalism impacts relations among firms and states as individual firms
and the chain as a whole navigate and transform the multiple states, regulators
and legal regimes with which they interact in the pursuit of their business
objectives . . . and to broaden our notions of political economy to encompass
the multiplicity of firm/state relations that global value chains entail’.21
To study the extent and implications of the mutual dependence and coevolution of law and GVCs, members of the Law and Global Production
Working Group have initiated projects that illuminate some of the ways in
which our research questions and methods can be pursued. These projects
cluster along three broad themes: the legal geography of GVCs; the relation
between law, value and bargaining power in GVCs; and the role of law in GVC
governance. In the remainder of this manifesto, we provide an overview of these
overarching themes using examples from group members’ projects where appropriate to suggest how these themes might begin to be productively explored.
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22 Cf. Milberg & Winkler (2013); UNCTAD (2013); Cowen (2014).
23 Cf. A Ruhmkorf, Corporate Social Responsibility, Private Law and Global Supply Chains (Edward
Elgar, 2015); P Rott & V Ulfbeck, ‘Supply Chain Liability of Multinational Corporations?’ 23
European Review of Private Law (2015) 415; M Conway, ‘A New Duty of Care? Tort Liability
from Voluntary Human Rights Due Diligence in Global Supply Chains’ 40 Queen’s Law Journal
(2015) 741.
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To get a sense of what such a mapping project could entail, consider a
hypothetical multinational corporation (MNC) of the type that is, according to
the UNCTAD report cited above,22 shaping 80 per cent of world trade. In
organising their productive activities, MNCs first face the classic ‘make versus
buy’ decision. These options already point in the direction of two different
traditionally demarcated fields of law—corporate law for the institutional
form through which business is conducted, and contract law for the interface
between legal entities. If the firm decides to make the product abroad, it must
also decide where to locate its subsidiary, perhaps provoking a comparison of
the domestic laws and enforcement practices of contending and competing
potential host countries, as well as the relative impact on those hosts’ applicable
trade, investment and intellectual property rules. By contrast, a ‘buy’ decision
from a foreign supplier may implicate international commercial law, various
public and private industry standards, international commercial arbitration
rules or domestic dispute resolution regimes, as well as the domestic contract
law of both the MNC’s and the foreign supplier’s home jurisdictions.
This radically simplified example becomes all the more complex when we
consider that diverse forms of productive activity will involve multiple kinds of
law, and different business actors pursuing the same business activity may make
different choices based on their assessment of the legal and economic terrain
with which they seek to engage and the distributive effects they seek to achieve.
Such choices will have significant impact on firms’ bargaining power, for example, and exposure to commercial risk.
Or, to take another example, organising global production through networks of independent firms that coordinate exchanges via contract rather than
ownership might have as much to do with mitigating tort or other legal liability
risks and the degree of enforcement in a particular locale as it does with economic productivity.23 A firm makes decisions on where to site production
based on a mixture of factors such as the legal requirements it will face, how
likely it is that such requirements will be policed and enforced by public authorities, as well as an assessment of the likelihood that labour unions, or other
external forces such as social movements, NGOs or public interest lawyers, may
challenge its actions. Of course, the relative significance of particular legal
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24 Cf. G Bridge, ‘Global Production Networks and the Extractive Sector: Governing Resource-Based
Development’ 8 Journal of Economic Geography (2008) 389.
25 Cf. L Campling & E Havice, ‘The Problem of Property in Industrial Fisheries’ 41 The Journal of
Peasant Studies (2014) 707.
26 JS Ovadia, ‘Local Content and Natural Resource Governance: The Cases of Angola and Nigeria’ 1
The Extractive Industries and Society (2014) 137.
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regimes on the organisation and operation of particular chains will vary and is
ultimately an empirical question.
Within our working group, initial efforts at mapping the legal geographies of GVCs have focused on extractive industries. This is because some
group members have found that the ways in which such industries are often,
though not always, rooted in particular jurisdictions offer particular insights
into the articulations of law in GVCs. First, soil and mineral resources form
the bases of the production networks of all goods and services, beginning
with the food that fuels human labour, and the energy that drives global
production and powers global transportation. Second, natural resource
industries have immense global (geo)political significance. The firms engaged
in these industries are among the largest in the world24 and the geo-politics
of resource extraction shape intimately the inter-state system, most prominently in the case of hydrocarbon resources. Finally, extractives are not only
profoundly important to international trade; they are also critical for socioeconomic development, especially in the global South. Law plays a central
role in structuring the conditions under which such resources are accessed,
traded, extracted, monetised and consumed.25 Legal systems also critically
shape the distributive dynamics—and conflicts over—the value produced in
these GVCs.
As in all sectors, in extractive industries multiple interest groups, including
multinational firms, states and labour, seek to extract various kinds of wealth
from the GVCs of which they are a part, while conservation and human rights
groups seek to structure chains in ways that they believe improve the ecological
and human condition. Several projects explore the role of law and legal regimes
in ordering these contests in extractive sectors. For example, Liam Campling
and Elizabeth Havice illustrate how interlocking and sometimes contradictory
global, regional and national legal systems combine with the material features of
highly migratory fisheries to shape the geographies of extraction, production
and consumption in the global tuna industry. Jesse Salah Ovadia explores the
role of local content policies26 in leveraging the unique nature of the petroleum
value chain in ‘upgrading’ schemes that create the possibility of what he calls
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‘the petro-developmental state’,27 while Lucie E. White is working with a team
of law students and scholars to analyse how political contests over Ghana’s
petroleum revenue management priorities are embedded in the intricacies of
its petroleum management laws. These debates over national petro-spending
priorities are in turn nested within geo-political contests over whether Ghana’s
extraction rents should be (re)distributed at local, national or supra-national
levels. Each response to this geo-political question is configured through a
different nexus of laws. By integrating critical legal scholarship and GVC analysis, the projects seek to explore nodes of power in extractive industries and
bring attention to prominent policy questions, especially around intersecting
questions of materiality, geopolitics and ‘development’.

A second theme that merits serious scholarly attention is the role of law in the
creation, recognition and distribution of value among actors in GVCs, as well as
the relationship between legal entitlements and bargaining power in chain
structures. In particular, we believe a focus on the constitutive role of law in
the production process and in the economy poses serious challenges for notions
of ‘value’ and ‘value-added’ commonly held by scholars of GVCs.
In most ‘orthodox’ or policy-oriented literature on GVCs, value is defined
as ‘value-added’—that is, simply the value of the output at each link minus the
value of inputs. The assumption underlying this metric is that some value is
added at each successive stage in the chain. However, because the amount of
value-added may vary significantly from link to link, the benefits of participating in the chain are often unevenly distributed.28
For mainstream GVC analysts, ‘value-added’ is the recognition, in economic terms, of productive innovation. Innovation generates new products
and/or processes, which, when protected by barriers to entry, generate
Schumpeterian profits, or what Kaplinsky29 refers to as ‘rent’. This concept
of value-added underlies much of the appeal of the GVC framework. For
firms it provides a straightforward prescription: create proprietary innovations.
For developing countries, it suggests a policy imperative: encourage not just
innovation, but the integration of firms into those global chains which provide
the best returns on innovation. This process of ‘moving up the value chain’, or
27 JS Ovadia, The Petro-Developmental State in Africa: Making Oil Work in Angola, Nigeria and the Gulf
of Guinea (Hurst & Co., 2016).
28 J Dedrick, KL Kraemer & G Linden, ‘Who Profits from Innovation in Global Value Chains? A Study
of the iPod and Notebook PCs’ 19 Industrial and Corporate Change (2010) 81.
29 R Kaplinsky, Globalization, Poverty and Inequality: Between a Rock and a Hard Place (Polity Press,
2005).
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30 G Gereffi, ‘International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel Commodity Chain’ 48
Journal of International Economics (1999) 37; P Gibbon, ‘Upgrading Primary Production: A Global
Commodity Chain Approach’ 29 World Development (2001) 345.
31 Cf. TJ Sturgeon, PB Nielsen, G Linden, G Gereffi & C Brown, ‘Direct Measurement of Global Value
Chains: Collecting Product- and Firm-level Statistics on Value Added and Business Function
Outsourcing and Offshoring’, in A Mattoo et al. (eds), Trade in Value Added: Developing New
Measures of Cross-Border Trade (World Bank, 2013) 289.
32 Cf. Milberg & Winkler (2013); F Palpacuer, ‘Bringing the Social Context Back In: Governance and
Wealth Distribution in Global Commodity Chains’ 37 Economy and Society (2008) 393; B Selwyn,
Workers, State and Development in Brazil: Powers of Labour, Chains of Value (Manchester UP, 2012);
J Heintz, ‘Low-wage Manufacturing and Global Commodity Chains: A Model in the Unequal
Exchange Tradition’ 20 Cambridge Journal of Economics (2006) 507.
33 S Barrientos, G Gereffi & A Rossi, ‘Economic and Social Upgrading in Global Production Networks:
A New Paradigm for a Changing World’ 150 International Labour Review (2012) 319.
34 Cf. R Hale, ‘Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State’ 38 Political Science
Quarterly (1923) 470. See also M Cohen, ‘Property and Sovereignty’ 13 Cornell Law Review (1927) 8;
Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (fin de siècle) (Harvard UP, 1998); David Kennedy,
‘Some Caution about Property Rights as a Recipe for Economic Development’ 1 Accounting,
Economics, and Law (2011) 1.
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capturing an ever greater share of the value generated along it, is described in
the GVC literature as ‘upgrading’.30
While, at an intuitive level, value-added through upgrading in GVCs may
seem a straightforward proposition, researchers face multiple practical and
conceptual difficulties in accessing, systematising and measuring relevant data
on value and value-adding processes.31 Some development scholars have questioned the implications of firm-level upgrading for workers or its consequences
more broadly for the processes of productivity growth and (human) capital
formation traditionally associated with macro-level development.32 Recent
work has even tried to expand the concept of firm-level upgrading, beyond a
narrow focus on value-added, to incorporate a ‘social upgrading’ dimension
that addresses the quantity and quality of employment generated at particular
links in a value chain.33 These efforts reveal underlying tensions around this
notion of value and the application of GVC thinking in its pursuit. Yet, these
tensions have not, thus far, led to a conceptual reassessment among most GVC
scholars of ‘value’ and ‘value-added’.
We have found that bringing critical legal insights to the analysis of the
production and distribution of value in chain structures opens a range of new
avenues for promising research. Following the tradition of Robert Hale, Morris
Cohen, Duncan Kennedy, David Kennedy and other critical legal theorists,
scholars have long recognised that legal entitlements impact the relative
power of social actors, and as a consequence, the distribution of present and
future resources among such actors.34 The most accessible example of this
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35 One such inconsistency can be found in the GPN literature of the so-called Manchester school of
economic geography. Falling within the broad domain of GVC studies, the GPN (or Global
Production Network) approach also investigates questions of value, but within this collectively-authored body of work, there is no explicit discussion or recognition of the fact that a (class-relational)
Marxian theory of surplus value is melded with a technical-economic theory of rent. Cf. J
Henderson, P Dicken, M Hess, N Coe & H Wai-Chung Yeung, ‘Global Production Networks and
the Analysis of Economic Development’ 9 Review of International Political Economy (2002) 436.
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insight might be a property entitlement that gives one actor the right to exclude
all others from use of the subject’s property. If the resource to which the property right attaches is something others need, the right holder will have the power
to demand concessions from the others to gain access to it. If access to the thing
is crucial to the others’ survival, the right holder’s power to extract concessions
may extend to complete servitude by the others. By contrast, if the property is of
relatively little use to the others or access to similar property is readily available,
the ability to exact concessions for its use will be accordingly more limited. At a
simple level, a focus on legal entitlements can help clarify how the ‘value’ in a
GVC is distributed among the actors participating in it, while also focusing
attention on numerous background legal regimes that undergird and structure
market ordering in the first instance.
To be clear, we see the relationship between law and value as more than a
matter of how value is distributed. Our research agenda calls for opening the
‘black box’ of value-added in order to interrogate, more precisely, what role the
law might play in the production of value. As a group we acknowledge—but do
not claim to resolve—the theoretical tensions among us and the orthodox
approach to GVCs with regard to the question of value. Such tensions, for
instance, reside ineluctably at the interface between the Marxian theory of
value, Schumpeterian conception of rents and Hale-ian analysis of coercion
and bargaining power. We recognise this tension because we have found it a
source of intellectual energy that enriches understanding and that is preferable
to neat formulations that gloss over internal theoretical inconsistencies.35
Despite these theoretical tensions, it is a shared interest in how powerladen social relations construct systems of production, exchange and distribution that has allowed the legal scholars among us to talk so effectively with the
political economists and sociologists. More specifically, we share a common
interest in the following kinds of questions: What role does law play in creating
barriers to entry at particular links in the chain, and thus in creating and protecting rents? How do legal dynamics with regard to the appropriation of rent
influence how chains are organised, including their geographic configuration?
Since legal entitlements shape the relative bargaining power of actors to extract
concessions from each other, in what way do changes in legal entitlements affect
the distribution of bargaining power and hence the distribution of resources?
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36 Cf. P Miller & M Power, ‘Accounting, Organizing, and Economizing: Connecting Accounting
Research and Organization Theory’ 7 The Academy of Management Annals (2013) 557.
37 Cf. recently A Cobham & P Jansky, ‘Measuring Misalignment: the Location of US Multinationals’
Economic Activity Versus the Location of their Profits’, ICTD Working Paper 42 (Nov 2015),
available at http://www.ictd.ac/publications (last visited 7 January 2016).
38 Cf. for different country studies H Löfgren & OW Williams (eds), The Palgrave Macmillan New
Political Economy of Pharmaceuticals. Production, Innovation and TRIPS in the Global South
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) and generally M Carolan, ‘Making Patents and Intellectual Property
Work. The Asymmetrical “Harmonization” of TRIPS’ 21 Organization & Environment (2008) 295.
39 Cf. on these dynamics C Hennig, ‘Free Trade Zones/Export Processing Zones’, in DT Cook & JM
Ryan (eds), The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Consumption and Consumer Studies (Wiley
Blackwell, 2015) 310.
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What tools (legal and otherwise) enable which actors to define what constitutes
value and/or reshape the conditions under which it is generated and
distributed?
Issues of legal entitlements and their role in the creation and distribution
of value pervade GVCs, including tax law, IP law, labour law and the plethora of
legal structures that have enabled financialisation.36 For example, the ubiquitous practice of tax structuring for the purpose of maximising post-tax profitability brings into stark relief how the existence, recognition and location of
value may be as much a function of legal rules as production processes.37 Or as
an example from intellectual property law reveals, under the global patent
regime established by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs), multinational pharmaceutical companies have been
able to maintain higher prices globally for their patented drugs than under the
previous nationally divergent patent regimes that allowed India, Brazil, Egypt
and other nations to develop competing drugs based on identical pharmaceutical compounds.38 While one might debate the economic or moral justifications
for this change in global patent regulation, its impact on the legal distribution of
value among pharmaceutical producers and nations around the world is
indisputable.
Labour law is practically defined by questions of value. Thinking through
labour law vis-à-vis GVCs opens space for rethinking value and value-added
processes. For example, looking at the variegated application of law across a
single value chain could spur research into, for example, the ‘low’ value-added
attributed to low-wage workers in export processing zones and the ways that the
‘value’ that these workers ‘add’ is constrained, in part, by legal limitations on
the scope of productive activities permissible in the zones (such as, e.g., limiting
workers in the zones to processing imported foreign inputs for re-export and
prohibiting the formation of trade unions and/or collective bargaining).39 Or
how the value produced by workers in one part of a value chain may be limited
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40 See Anner, Bair & Blasi (2013); C Dolan, ‘On Farm and Packhouse: Employment at the Bottom of a
Global Value Chain’ 69 Rural Sociology (2004) 99.
41 Cf. W Milberg, ‘Shifting Sources and Uses of Profits: Sustaining US Financialisation with Global
Value Chains’ 37 Economy and Society (2008) 420. For a synopsis of the phenomenon, cf. G Epstein,
‘Financialization and the World Economy’, in G Epstein (ed.), Financialisation and the World
Economy (Edward Elgar, 2005) 3.
42 See, e.g., for a discussion of shareholder activism in labour law S Jacoby, ‘Finance and Labor:
Perspectives on Risk, Inequality, and Democracy’ 30 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal
(2008) 17 and B Rogers, ‘Complexities of Shareholder Primacy: A Response to Sanford Jacoby’ 30
Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal (2008) 95.
43 Development policy and practice at the international financial institutions represents one potentially
interesting research topic along these lines, particularly with regard to the possible intersection of the
GVC turn in development policy—cf. M Werner, J Bair & VR Fernández, ‘Linking Up to
Development? Global Value Chains and the Making of a Post-Washington Consensus’ 45
Development and Change (2014) 1219 and J Neilson, ‘Global Value Chains, Neoliberalism and
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by firms elsewhere in the chain, and the ways in which legal control over certain
key elements in the production chain, such as intellectual property, may enhance a firm’s power over other parts of the chain. It also opens space for
analysis of how the right to organise, the right to strike and the right to protest
against unsafe and exploitative working conditions, and a resulting ability for
workers to command higher wages, might affect not just the value they ‘add’ to
the production process, but also the distribution of that value in terms of the
amount that they capture. Similarly, the pricing practices of powerful buyers in
one part of a chain may produce significant effects on the existence or enforcement of labour standards in other parts of the chain.40 This discussion of labour
highlights the many ways in which what might seem identifiable as ‘economic’
or ‘legal’ factors interact dynamically, making attributions of which factor is
producing what effect hard to discern. At the same time, recognising that
differences in bargaining power among chain actors may be as much a function
of legal and policy choices as of ‘market forces’ suggests that different legal or
policy choices could produce profoundly different (and perhaps much more
equitable) distributions of power and rents across the chain.
Important additional insights into the relationship between law and value
can be found in exploring finance in the context of GVCs. For example, although the impact of financialisation on the globalisation of production is
widely acknowledged, there is surprisingly little research on the significance
of financialisation on the creation or destruction of value within GVCs.41
Since legal systems (or the arbitrage of gaps in or among legal systems) often
define the parameters of risk and reward in financial structures,42 some members of our research group are focusing on the role of financial capital and
finance law in structuring GVCs, and, conversely, on how GVCs impact and/or
undermine systems of financial regulation.43 For example, Liam Campling and
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Development Practice: The Indonesian Experience’ 21 Review of International Political Economy
(2014) 38—and the emphasis on ‘financial development’ as a central plank of the contemporary
international development agenda—cf. S Soederberg, ‘The Emperor’s New Suit: The New
International Financial Architecture as a Reinvention of the Washington Consensus’ 7 Global
Governance (2001) 453.
44 Cf., e.g., L Russi & T Ferrando, ‘“Capitalism A Nuh’ Wi Frien”: The Formatting of Farming into an
Asset, from Financial Speculation to International Aid’ 6 Catalyst, A Social Justice Forum (2015),
available at http://trace.tennessee.edu/catalyst/ (last visited 7 January 2016); L Russi, Hungry Capital:
The Financialization of Food (Zero Books, 2013); Oxfam, ‘Don’t Gamble with Food. How the
German Financial Industry is Making a Business Out of Hunger’ (2011), available at https://
www.oxfam.de/sites/www.oxfam.de/files/englische_zusammenfassung_final.pdf (last visited 7
January 2016); S Murphy, D Burch & J Clapp, ‘Cereal Secrets: The World’s Largest Grain Traders
and Global Agriculture’, Oxfam Report (August 2012), available at https://www.oxfam.org/sites/
www.oxfam.org/files/rr-cereal-secrets-grain-traders-agriculture-30082012-en.pdf (last visited 7
January 2016).
45 S Barrientos, ‘Gendered Global Production Networks: Analysis of Cocoa-Chocolate Sourcing’ 48
Regional Studies (2014) 791; M Werner, ‘Beyond Upgrading: Gendered Labor and the Restructuring
of Firms in the Dominican Republic’ 88 Economic Geography (2012) 403.
46 M Carr & M Chen, ‘Globalization, Social Exclusion and Gender’ 143 International Labour Review
(2004) 129; M Werner & J Bair, ‘Commodity Chains and the Uneven Geographies of Global
Capitalism: A Disarticulations Perspective’ 43 Environment and Planning (2011) 988.
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David Quentin draw on Marx’s theory of value to support their argument that
financial flows resulting from GVC structures and disparate tax systems reinforce global inequalities between firms, countries, classes and genders, as well as
how these inequities might be alleviated through tax reform at the national and
transnational levels. In another project, Tomaso Ferrando is analysing recent
reports on the financialisation of food chains and the effect of financial crises on
food security in the global South44 in order to explore how law is implicated in
creating or permitting recent food shortages.
It seems important to note that law is not only relevant to issues of value
and power when it is directed expressly to the sphere of market exchange. For
example, family law regimes and gender norms shape the distribution of labour
market opportunities as well as how unpaid reproductive labour is performed.45 Welfare regimes enable workers to enter or exit the labour market
and help determine workers’ bargaining power vis-à-vis employers and each
other. Permissive and restrictive norms surrounding the treatment of ethnic,
racial and religious groupings establish hierarchies of access that structure the
ability of these groups to create and extract ‘value’ through participation in
GVCs.46
Finally, it is also significant that law can impact GVCs both by what it
permits or omits as well as what it affirmatively requires. As has been discussed,
a lack of legal entitlements (such as property rights or a right to organise), the
absence of formal regulation, a policy or practice of selective or
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Law and GVC governance

In GVC literature, governance refers to the process of coordinating the
relationships among actors at different links in a value chain and it has been
a core preoccupation.49 Stefano Ponte and Timothy Sturgeon explain that
‘[t]he idea of governance in GVCs rests on the assumption that, while both
disintegration of production and its re-integration through inter-firm trade
have recognizable dynamics, they do not occur spontaneously . . . . Instead
these processes are “driven” by the strategies and decisions of specific actors.
The relevance of GVC governance is that it examines the concrete practices,
power dynamics, and organizational forms that give character and structure to
cross-border business networks.’50
Gary Gereffi’s original formulation of governance in what were then called
commodity chains identified both a ‘producer-driven’ logic and a ‘buyer47 Cf. A Santos & D Trubek (eds), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal
(Cambridge UP, 2006); A Santos, ‘Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform and Economic Development’ 50
Virginia Journal of International Law (2009) 43.
48 E.g. K Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science’, in
C Brown & K Miles (eds), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cambridge UP,
2011) 606.
49 On the narrower meaning of ‘governance’ in the legal discourse and generally on the competing
interpretations, cf. Zumbansen (2012).
50 S Ponte & T Sturgeon, ‘Explaining Governance in Global Value Chains: A Modular Theory-building
Effort’ 21 Review of International Political Economy (2014) 195, 200.
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non-enforcement, or a failure to enforce may be as powerful in shaping the
behaviour of firms or the welfare of particular chain actors as formal rules
regularly enforced.47 Moreover, the decision by a state not to regulate or enforce
a legal rule (e.g., a local content requirement) may result from an effort to
comply with another conflicting legal obligation (such as a bilateral investment
treaty or a trade agreement).48 Law shapes power and value both when it seems
to be acting and when it appears to be absent.
In sum, the ways in which law creates and distributes value and bargaining
power are numerous and pervasive. We have found a focus on these dynamics
in GVCs to be particularly fruitful both for enhancing our understanding of the
background legal norms that are shaping the relative bargaining positions of
actors in the global economy, as well as of the relative ability of such actors to
participate in chain structures or to capture an equitable share of chain surplus.
This strand of law and GVC research also seems important in helping to identify
which legal and policy tools might be most useful to shift power and resources
more equitably across chains.
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51 G Gereffi, ‘The Organization of Buyer-driven Global Commodity Chains: How U.S. Retailers Shape
Overseas Production Networks’, in G Gereffi & M Korzeniewicz (eds), Commodity Chains and
Global Capitalism (Praeger, 1994) 95.
52 The GVC literature now offers multiple conceptualisations of governance; some conceive it as
sector-wide patterns of coordination that are produced by specific industry-level characteristics:
see, e.g., G Gereffi, J Humphrey & T Sturgeon, ‘The Governance of Global Value Chains’ 12 Review
of International Political Economy (2005) 78; T Sturgeon, ‘Modular Production Networks. A New
American Model of Industrial Organization’ 11 Industrial and Corporate Change (2002) 451. Others
draw from convention theory, arguing that diverse forms of governance can be found within an
industry because multiple conceptualisations of quality can be used to justify or distinguish products
in the market: cf. L Boltanski & L Thévenot, On Justification: Economies of Worth (Princeton UP,
2006) and S Ponte & P Gibbon, ‘Quality Standards, Conventions and the Governance of Global
Value Chains’ 34 Economy and Society (2005) 1. Still others continue to find the most analytical value
in the producer- and buyer-driven distinction, even as the proportion of value-adding activities
conducted outside the organisational boundaries of the lead firm are increasing in the more capital-intensive, manufacturer-centred industries associated with producer-driven governance.
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driven’ logic.51 The criterion for differentiating between buyer- and
producer-driven chains was who had the power to control the organisation of
activities and the distribution of value along the chain: manufacturers (i.e.,
those who make) or retailers (i.e., those who buy). Subsequent literature shifted
towards a concern with how governance was exercised and why it takes the form
that it does.52 At a general level, then, the primary focus of governance within
the GVC literature has been elaborating typologies of, and developing explanations for, the ways in which coordination is achieved in geographically dispersed and organisationally fragmented production networks.
While the insights of GVC scholars on lead firms and their role in chain
governance tell us much, we are only at the beginning of understanding law’s
role in GVC governance. More research is needed in order to better understand
the circumstances under which firms assume chain coordinating functions, and
in particular, about the tools (legal or otherwise) at their disposal for carrying
out those functions. This is because, although the assumption of coordinating
functions may be motivated by technical or managerial imperatives or pressure
from competitors or consumers, not surprisingly, it may also result from legal
regulation or arbitrage. A research focus on law and the distribution of power
among chain actors is important not only with regard to developing a richer
analysis of the mechanisms through which value is created and rent captured,
but also for the purpose of elaborating the means through which chain activities
are, or could be, coordinated and controlled.
A central plank of this research project is to examine the legal (as well as
commercial) mechanisms through which coordination and control are
exercised among actors within chains. For example, why do some chain
actors coordinate some relationships through ownership and others through
contract? A Coasian analysis highlighting the incentive structure set by
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53 Cf. R Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ 4 Economica (1937) 386 (suggesting markets and firms as
competing model types in the organisation of production).
54 See, e.g., J Armour, H Hansmann & R Kraakman, ‘Agency Problems and Legal Strategies’, in R
Kraakman et al. (eds), The Anatomy of Corporate Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford UP, 2009) 35.
55 Cf. Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon (2005).
56 See J Salminen, ‘Contract Boundary Spanning Governance Mechanisms: Conceptualizing
Fragmented and Globalized Production as Collectively Governed Entities’ forthcoming in 23
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2016) (using comparative law insights to establish a transnational discourse in law and value chain governance which goes beyond national conceptualisations of contract and tort).
57 Suggestions acknowledging the public and regulatory function of contracts include relational contracting—cf. as locus classicus S Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study’ 28 American Sociological Review (1963) 1 and I Macneil, ‘Relational Contract Theory:
Challenges and Queries’ 94 Northwestern University Law Review (2000) 877—as well as, more
recently, ‘contract networks’—cf. G Teubner, Networks as Connected Contracts (Hart, 2011)—‘organisational contracts’—cf. S Grundmann, F Cafaggi & G Vettori (eds), The Organizational
Contract. From Exchange to Long-Term Network Cooperation in European Contract Law (Ashgate,
2013)—and ‘contracting for innovation’—cf. R Gilson, C Sabel & R Scott, ‘Contracting for
Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration’ 109 Columbia Law Review
(2009) 431.
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transaction costs53 suggests that the consolidated firm is necessary when the
transaction costs of efficient coordination of independent economic actors
through contract are too high. More recent firm theory focuses attention on
controlling the agency costs associated with the monitoring and control of
management by owners.54 One might expect that agency costs associated
with coordination and monitoring of large, globally disaggregated GVCs
might be quite high. What legal mechanisms help to reconcile these costs and
tensions in GVCs? In the absence of any sovereign with jurisdiction over the
GVC, or any system of law binding on the GVC as a whole and each of its
constituent actors, how are norms of coordination and behaviour transnationalised through the chain?
For example, four of the five types of governance proposed by Gereffi,
Humphrey and Sturgeon in their influential theory of GVC governance—
market, relational, captive and modular—fall under the broad category of contract.55 To what extent are legal conceptions of contract, built within national
frameworks, able to accommodate multiple, legally independent actors in networked but not necessarily arm’s length relationships with one another? Might
supplier contracts, for instance, provide the legal basis for liability for actors
across the chain?56 To what extent are current conceptions of contract able to
evolve in order to deal with the public and regulatory functions that lead firms
exercise, and sometimes delegate?57 How does law affect who has the ability to
set the terms of exchange in a GVC? And which legal forum has authority to
adjudicate disputes arising either between participants in the GVC or between
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58 Legal scholarship on international commercial arbitration, for example, thus far almost completely
fails to recognise or analyse the origins and deeper effects of variance in bargaining power, treating
disputing parties as formal legal equals despite vast material differences. Cf. G Baars, The
Corporation, Law and Capitalism (Brill, forthcoming); K Amaeshi, O Kingsley Osuji & P
Nnodim, ‘Corporate Control and Accountability in supply chains of Multinational Corporations:
Clarifications and Managerial Implications’, ICCSR Research Paper No. 46-2007, available at http://
www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/ICCSR/research.php?action¼download&id¼34 (last visited 7
January 2016).
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participants and third parties external to the GVC?58 Or even more fundamentally, what distinguishes a GVC from a series of disarticulated commercial (or
market) transactions and what is the role of law in the distinction?
Several projects have been initiated by members of our group around the
theme of law and governance. In one, Jennifer Bair, Jason Jackson and Brishen
Rogers trace the emergence of a new form of labour regulation that they identify
as ‘supply chain liability’. Prior private regulatory efforts such as transnational
tort litigation and unilateral codes of conduct laid the groundwork for such new
legal regimes, but states have begun to push beyond the limitations of normbased governance. For example, Israel, the Netherlands and various states
within the US have begun to hold domestic firms jointly liable for their overseas
contractors’ and suppliers’ labour law violations. While those laws are
embedded in national legal systems, and accordingly vary in many ways, they
share a common core: they establish a duty of care rooted in tort doctrines
requiring party A to prevent party B from causing harms to party C. Bair,
Jackson and Rogers examine the degree to which the legal logics underlying
this emergent regulatory form rest on claims about the nature of lead firm
governance in specific GVCs and its effects. Specifically, they suggest three
dimensions which they believe will prove critical for developing the jurisprudence of supply chain liability: the specific labour practices for which lead firms
should be responsible; what standards of liability should apply so as to differentiate firms based upon their capacity to ensure decent work and whether
those standards should vary based upon the geographic location of production
work; and provisions for private or public enforcement, whether in domestic or
new transnational tribunals.
Additional projects by Dez Farkas and Jaakko Salminen explore the theme
of law and governance through contract. Farkas’s project draws on examples
from the recent financial crisis and the electronics sector and uses recent developments in corporate governance to interrogate the structural and distributional dimensions of GVCs and their underlying assumptions of value. His
project pays particular attention to how complex inter-firm relations, often
linked by contract alone, can undermine efforts to hold domestic firms liable
for violations by the foreign affiliates over whom they exercise governance, and
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Sometimes [corporations] contribute through interpretations of or
reactions to a legal rules scheme. Sometimes they supply rules where
none exist. Sometimes they shape a rule scheme through direct
political or economic pressure on regulators. Sometimes they shape it
by evading the rule scheme and doing business elsewhere. Sometimes
to satisfy other business purposes they adopt more stringent practices
than the applicable rules require. Sometimes they act on their own to
get a market edge or exploit an opportunity. Sometimes they act in
groups to create a harmonized regulatory environment or to prevent
regulation. These diverse forms of corporate actions and decisions are
related to the applicable legal rules and the acts and decisions of
regulators, but are not wholly determined by them. When corporations create or shape the content, interpretation, efficacy, or
enforcement of legal regimes, and, in so doing, produce effects on
social welfare similar to the effects resulting from rulemaking and
enforcement by governments, corporate actors are engaged in
governance.59

59 D Danielsen, ‘How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate Power Seriously in Transnational
Regulation and Governance’ 46 Harvard Journal of International Law (2005) 411, 412.
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explores the legal mechanisms that enable internal firm governance to influence
other value chain actors.
Salminen’s work involves bringing together research in GVC governance
with research into the legal mechanisms used for governing complex contractual structures. Turning towards comparative law, this project aims to elaborate
a transnational discourse on law and value chain governance that transcends
different national conceptualisations of contract, tort and other relevant legal
relationships.
From here we can see that law is not, or not only, an exogenous factor that
firms confront in making decisions about where and how to do business, nor
can it be reduced to an external force that ‘guides’, ‘drives’, ‘pulls’ and ‘pushes’
the value chain. This is because, while the legal environment undoubtedly
shapes firm-level decisions, the large corporations that coordinate many of
the most expansive and consequential GVCs are not simply ‘context-takers’.
They also help to produce the rules that govern their operations through,
among other things, the pursuit of their business objectives.
In his work on transnational corporations, Dan Danielsen has sought to
catalogue some of the ways in which corporate actors create and shape local,
national, regional and transnational legal regimes. He states:

78

The IGLP Law and Global Production Working Group: The role of law in GVCs

Deborah McBarnet has argued that the work of lobbyists, lawyers, accountants and strategists is a fundamental component of GVCs. This work,
which she calls ‘transnational legal work’, is
not just about playing with the different laws of different jurisdictions,
finding tax—or regulatory—havens, set up precisely for that purpose. It
is about playing with law per se, even within one jurisdiction. It is about
constructing ‘creative compliance’, finding legal forms which fall outside
disadvantageous or inside advantageous legal categories. . . . It is about
concocting legal forms as yet undreamt of by legislators and regulators.60

CONCLUSION

By now it should be clear that our research ambition extends well beyond
exploring the impact of GVCs on legal scholarship or of law on GVCs.
Rather, we aim for nothing less than a legal ontology of the GVC, which
under conditions of contemporary capitalism, should take us some distance
towards a richer theoretical and empirical understanding of the global economy
tout court. Doubtless, bringing law into the centre of GVC analysis will add
substantial complexity to a field already rife with complexity. Yet, as we hope we
have demonstrated, the continued relegation of law to ‘exogeneity’ or ‘context’
misses a great deal of the constitutive role of law in the structure, geography and
function of GVCs; the creation, recognition and distribution of value in GVCs;
60 DM McBarnet, ‘Transnational Transactions – Legal Work, Cross-border Commerce and Global
Regulation’, in M Likosky (ed.), Transnational Legal Processes (Butterworths, 2002) 369, 385.
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From this perspective, law not only acts upon firms, delimiting or regulating their global activities; it is also a resource that corporate actors mobilise and
innovate to produce certain value chain configurations and effects as well as a
product of the organisational and business choices undertaken by chain actors
in and through chain activities.
Our research agenda on the theme of chain governance, then, not only
calls for additional consideration of how states, directly and indirectly, shape
value chains specifically by and through law, but also how firms and chains
shape law and sovereignty. Perhaps more than any other, this conundrum
crystallises the central problem orienting our project: how to better understand
the productive tension between the territorial organisation of law and the jurisdictional boundaries that demarcate distinct legal regimes on the one hand,
and the global logic of value chains that operate across, but also through, these
regimes, transforming them in the process, on the other.
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61 See Neilson (2014) 38; Werner, Bair & Fernández (2014).
62 T Bartley & C Child, ‘Shaming the Corporation: The Social Production of Targets and the
Anti-Sweatshop Movement’ 79 American Sociological Review (2014) 653.
63 M Helfen & M Fichter, ‘Building Transnational Union Networks across Global Production
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64 R Schurman & W Munro, ‘Targeting Capital: A Cultural Economy Approach to Understanding the
Efficacy of Two Anti-Genetic Engineering Movements’ 115 American Journal of Sociology (2009) 155.
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and the mechanisms through which GVCs are coordinated and controlled. In
other words, simplifying law out of the GVC story leaves many of the core
explanatory aspirations of the traditional GVC analytic unmet. Through this
intervention, and our future work, we hope to begin to address this gap.
At the same time, we remain cognisant that the GVC is not an objective fact
but a heuristic for helping to understand the world. And, like any such heuristic,
the GVC cannot begin to capture the complexity and contingency characterising
real-world global production. For this reason, we must remain attuned to the
ways in which different theoretical conceptions of the GVC are being deployed
by or gaining traction with different scholars and institutions and the purpose(s) to which those conceptions are being put. After all, the claim that
GVCs are the ‘face of the world economy’ can work to naturalise specific
ways of organising international economic activity, and legitimate particular
modes of incorporating developing country firms into global trade. From this
critical perspective, the GVC construct might itself be seen as a discursive resource that is being deployed to present as self-evident or inevitable developments that result from specific political and economic decisions.61 At the same
time, the GVC concept is also being mobilised by activists to ‘name and shame’
corporations;62 by global union federations seeking to organise a set of workplaces that are linked to the same lead firm;63 and by environmental activists
that lobby supermarkets to exclude genetically modified products from their
supply chain.64
In laying out this research agenda, then, we approach GVCs as the terrain
from which we can construct (hopefully) more useful maps of a rapidly changing and complicated global political economy, yielding a deeper understanding
of the relationship between law, value and power and the global political economy more generally. At the same time, we acknowledge that people (including
us) generally make maps with a particular destination in mind if not in view.
Thus, even as we pursue our individual and collective projects of value chain
mapping, we aim to highlight the necessarily political or normative implications
of our renderings–an aspiration we hope our attention to law, value and power
will help us to keep squarely in view.

